I. Background
   A. NOA & Scientific Realism
   Fine thinks that the natural ontological attitude (NOA) is neither realist nor antirealist, but a minimal, core position that both share.
   Musgrave thinks that “NOA is a thoroughly realist view.”

   B. Why Fine thinks he’s not a realist
   Realists have a more substantial, correspondence theory of truth; NOA’s is more minimal.
   • Correspondence theory of truth: “p” is true iff “p” corresponds to the fact that p.
   • Tarski’s (minimal) theory of truth: “p” is true iff p. [Also called Convention T.]

II. Musgrave’s Arguments
   A. Musgrave’s homely argument
   H1. If NOA is true, then we should accept the results of scientific investigations as ‘true’ in the same way that we accept the evidence of our senses.
   H2. If we should accept the theoretical results of scientific investigations as true in the same way that we accept the evidence of our senses, then realism is true.
   H3. ∴ If NOA is true, then realism is true. (From H1, H2)
   • As Musgrave puts it, antirealists cannot assent to what Fine calls the “core position,” in which case, there is no core position at all.

   B. Musgrave’s semantic argument
   S1. If NOA is true and it is rational to accept a theory, then it is rational to accept that the theory genuinely refers to the entities that it posits.
   S2. If it is rational to accept that a theory refers to the entities that it posits, then realism is true.
   S3. ∴ If NOA is true, then realism is true. (From S1, S2)

   C. The creepy objection to Musgrave
   C1. If realists only need Convention T, then every entity referred to in a true statement is real.
   C2. The statement “Ronald Reagan gives Musgrave the creeps” is true.
   C3. ∴ If realists only need Convention T, then the creeps are real. (From C1, C2)
   C4. The creeps are not real.
   C5. ∴ Realists need more than Convention T. (From C3, C4)

   D. Musgrave vs. the creeps
   1. If Convention T applies to a sentence “p,” then “p” must be construed literally.
   2. “Ronald Reagan gives Musgrave the creeps” should not be construed literally (read it as: “Ronald Reagan makes Musgrave nervous.”)
   3. So Convention T does not apply to “Ronald Reagan gives Musgrave the creeps.”
   • In other words, C1 is too weak: “To be a realist about X’s you must:
     (a) take statements about X’s at face value for logico-philosophical purposes;
     (b) apply Tarski’s Convention T to those statements; and
     (c) accept appropriate instances of those statements (e.g. X’s exist) as true.”
III. NOA & mind-independence

A. Fine's Reciprocity & Contamination Argument
RC1. If we know that $p$, then our minds stand in some relation to $p$.
RC2. If our minds stand in some relation to $p$, then $p$ is not independent of our minds.
RC3. ∴ Knowledge of any mind-independent facts is impossible. (From RC1, RC2)
RC4. If realism is true, then knowledge of mind-independent facts is possible.
RC5. ∴ Realism is not true. (From RC3, RC4)

B. Musgrave vs. reciprocity/contamination
RC2 is too weak: If our minds stand in some relation to $p$—and $p$ is true even when we do not stand in that relation—then $p$ is independent of our minds.

C. Idealist argument for RC3
I1. If all facts depend on our concepts, then knowledge of any mind-independent facts is impossible.
I2. All facts depend on our concepts (idealism).
RC3. ∴ Knowledge of any mind-independent facts is impossible. (From I1, I2)

D. Musgrave vs. idealism
1. If NOA is true, then we accept the results of science in the same way that we accept the evidence of our senses.
2. If $p$ is evidence of our senses and we accept that $p$, then we accept that there is a fact that $p$ independently of our concepts of $p$.
3. ∴ If NOA is true and we accept a scientific result $p$, then we accept that there is a fact that $p$ independently of our concepts of $p$. (From 1,2)
4. If we accept that there is a fact that $p$ independently of our concepts of $p$, then idealism is false.
5. ∴ If NOA is true, then idealism is false. (From 3,4)